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Swearingen and Lindstrom: A Battleground No More

Introduction
The state of Ohio has long been considered the quintessential battleground state, playing a
key role in deciding numerous presidential elections. In fact, using the concept of a “tipping point
state”, popularized by Nate Silver, Ohio has been the deciding state six times throughout
American’s history, second only to New York (“Tipping-Point State,” 2021). Yet the Buckeye
State’s designation as a battleground is fading. After being a key battleground in President
Obama’s 2012 reelection campaign, Donald Trump won the state’s two-party vote by over eight
percent despite losing the national popular vote by more than two percent (Dave Leip’s Atlas of
U.S. Presidential Elections”). This state-national voting difference can be measured using Cook’s
partisan voting index (PVI). After having very little partisan lean throughout the second half of
the twentieth century, Ohio had a three-point GOP lean after 2016 (“State PVIs”). This pro-GOP
advantage only increased after Joe Biden’s victory in 2020, when Trump once again won Ohio’s
vote by roughly eight percent despite losing the national popular vote by five percent (“Dave
Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections”). This increased Ohio’s pro-GOP lean to six percent,
which falls outside of the Cook Political Report’s traditional battleground measure (“Introducing
the 2021 Cook Political Report Partisan Voter Index”).
The central question of this manuscript is what is behind these partisan shifts? We make a
significant contribution to the literature by testing hypotheses from two strands within realignment
theory in the context of a state that is undergoing significant partisan change: geo-cultural and
socioeconomic/cosmopolitanism. The political science literature on realignments often focuses
on each explanation singly. Cultural issues are driving partisan changes, especially issues such as
abortion (Adams 1997), environmentalism (Lindaman & Haider-Markel, 2002), race (Valentino
& Sears, 2005), and religion (Campbell et al., 2018). There is also a robust literature on the
growing urban-rural divide (Gimpel, 2021; Johnston et al., 2019; Kelly & Lobao, 2019). Some of
these studies include economic factors as control variables, but they do not delve into the nuance
of shifting economic fortunes at the sub-county level. By studying the more than 1,500
communities across Ohio, we find evidence that both explanations are at work across the state.
Specifically, both Democrats and Republicans made gains in their geographic strongholds, but
Democrats have made larger inroads in more cosmopolitan communities. However, Republicans
made huge gains along the cultural dimension, giving them a strong advantage throughout the
state. These results have implications for not only future presidential campaigns and how they
target Ohio’s persuadable voters, but also for down ballot races in both the primary and general
elections.
Realignment: Describing Partisan Change
It was in 1955 when V.O. Key conceptualized critical realignments as those elections in
which public intensity is high and the outcome indicates a break from pre-existing cleavages. The
result of these elections is a durable shift in the party system. As evidence, he pointed at the 1928
presidential election in New England, where the Democratic nominee, Al Smith, gained traction
among low-income, Catholic, and immigrant voters (Key, 1955). Key’s conceptualization was
picked up by other scholars, who worked to build a coherent theory of national partisan change
and identify which elections fit accordingly (see also Schattschneider, 1960; Burnham, 1971;
Sundquist, 1983).
The idea of critical realignments, while appealing, has empirical and conceptual issues,
perhaps best embodied by Mayhew’s critiques (2000; 2008). Most relevant for this project is the
idea that realignments are national in nature and are embodied by sudden change. In fact, it was
V.O. Key himself, who in 1959 wrote about secular realignment, noting that we can better
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understand party systems by considering decades-long shifts in party attachments among voters.
He also considered that these changes could occur by voters experiencing a decay in, or a new
development of, party attachments (Key, 1959).
Since Key’s pivotal work in 1959, a plethora of scholars have explored secular
realignments. Some have found, as Key hypothesized, that partisan changes occur when some
voters convert from one political party to another (Ladd & Hadley, 1975). This happened in the
South when the parties took distinct positions on race, culminating in the Republicans picking up
several southern congressional seats in the 1994 midterm elections (Abramowitz & Saunders,
1998). In some instances, voters are demobilized, leaving the electorate for one reason or another
(Shively, 1992), while others can be mobilized to enter the electorate (Campbell, 1985; Erikson &
Tedin, 1981).
Another component of secular realignment is that it can be regional or even statewide rather
than national (Bullock et al., 2006). A classic example of this is the post-New Deal realignment
that occurred in the South, transitioning it from the Democratic Solid South to the Solid South that
gave Republican presidential candidates all, or nearly all, of their electoral votes in 1972, 1980,
1984, 1988, 2000, and 2004 (Abramowitz & Saunders, 1998; Petrocik, 1987) and a majority of its
congressional seats after 1994 (Bullock et al., 2005). Yet regional realignment was not confined
solely to the South – Republicans made considerable gains in the Mountain West throughout the
1950s-1980s (Bullock, 1988), while Democrats were ascendant in the northeast throughout the
early 2000s (Scala & Johnson 2017); Democrats made gains in the New Southern states of Virginia
and North Carolina during the 2000s (McKee & Teigen, 2016), while the GOP increased their vote
share in the Industrial Midwest in 2016 (Monnat & Brown, 2017).
As noted in the introduction, Ohio is not immune to these changes. Despite its long-time
status as a battleground state, it is trending Republican. In addition, even when its partisan lean
was stable, there were voting shifts throughout the state. Hackworth (n.d.) finds that significant
changes were occurring not just in rural Ohio, but in its suburbs from the 1940s through the 1960s
largely due to race. Such changes were present throughout the state over the past 30-plus years.
Clark County (home of Springfield), which lies between Columbus and Dayton, was a Republicanleaning county (PVI of R+4) in 1988 before becoming dead even in the early 2000s; it is now
solidly Republican with a PVI of R+12. On the other side of the spectrum is Franklin County,
home of the state capital, Columbus. After the 2020 election, one GOP official stated that “there
are two or three times as many Democrats here as there are Republicans” (Kovac, 2020). Yet this
trend was anything but new: a Republican-leaning county after the 1988 election (R+6), it moved
to a toss-up as early as 2000 and is now solidly Democratic (D+13).
Trends in suburban Ohio follow those seen nationally. The suburbs can be a bit of mix
between old and new, cosmopolitanism and traditional values (Gimpel et al., 2020). In some cases,
suburbs and exurbs are trending Republican (Scala & Johnson 2017). Yet, in others, the opposite
is occurring. Gimpel et al. (2020) note that many suburbs across the nation are becoming more
diverse as African American and Latino voters move away from central cities. In addition, those
with the highest incomes are primarily located in the suburbs. These subtle distinctions and
realignment nuances warrant in-depth theoretical and empirical analyses.
Culture vs. Economics: Explanations of Partisan Change
With a broad understanding of the realignment literature and an overview of the shifting
partisan dynamics in Ohio, we now explore possible theoretical explanations for why the state is
changing. Below we detail two concepts that will drive our empirical tests: geo-cultural and
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socioeconomic/cosmopolitanism. These concepts are not mutually exclusive, but they are distinct
enough to generate separate hypotheses.
Culture Wars and the Urban-Rural Divide
Political pundits talk about the culture wars on a regular basis. Culture wars may “break
our democracy” (Stanton, 2021), have set the stage for “cancel culture” (Bump, 2021), are
inevitably won by liberals (Prothero, 2016), and were supposed to end during Obama’s first
presidential term (Teixeira, 2009). Hyperbole and poor predictions aside, political scientists argue
that the culture wars are an important concept in understanding partisan shifts (Highton, 2020;
Valentino & Sears, 2005; Pierson, 2017).
Donald Trump’s victory in 2016 brought greater scrutiny to this discussion, particularly in
the context of urban versus rural voters. Articles featuring pig farmers in Wisconsin who loved
Trump’s pledge to “Make America Great Again” (Carey, 2016), high rural turnout in 2016
demonstrating that these voters wanted “revenge” (Evich, 2016), and how and why Trump bested
Romney’s 2012 performance in small town America (Shearer, 2016) were ubiquitous. The
important thing to note, though, is that this partisan shift was not a sudden departure from the past.
As Johnston et al (2020) observe, counties across America have become more polarized. In 1992,
only 38 percent of counties were “landslide counties,” or those that gave one party at least 60
percent of the vote; the rest were at least somewhat competitive. From 1992 to 2012, the share of
landslide counties increased significantly, highlighting how much had shifted prior to Trump’s
election.
The link between cultural divisions and partisan change is rooted in Stimson’s and
Carmines’s (1989) seminal work on issue evolution. Building on Key’s theory of secular
realignment, they argue that partisan shifts occur over long periods of time. As specific issues
increase in salience on which the parties take distinct positions, the connection between a voter
and their preferred party can be altered. The resulting shift in partisan coalitions is a two-step
process: elites must take clear and differing stances on salient issues, to which the masses respond
(Bawn et al., 2012). Which issues drive change? It depends on the era and party system. Miller
and Schofield (2003; 2008) argue that during the New Deal coalition, economic issues cleaved the
two parties. Democrats could maintain their governing majority as long as they minimized cultural
issues, thus holding together their precarious coalition of the northern working class, minority, and
immigrant voters, along with white southerners. Beginning in the 1960s, cultural issues –
specifically race – split the Democratic Party. As these issues rose in prominence, the party
coalitions reformed along a combination of economic and cultural issues. Populist, conservative
Democrats shifted to the Republican Party, while highly educated, wealthy urban and suburban
voters that had been New Deal Republicans began voting for Democratic candidates.
Race is certainly one cultural issue that divides voters, but it is not the only one. Adams
(1997) identified abortion as a key cultural issue that led to a significant shift in party identification
throughout the 1970s-1990s. A few years later, Lindaman and Haider-Markel (2002) examined
others, including gay marriage, pornography, environmentalism, and gun control, finding that the
latter two were a significant component of the long-term shift in party coalitions. Yet another
aspect of culture is religion, as those with secular orientations have different political beliefs from
those who are deeply religious (Campbell et al., 2018). In many ways, this difference is
exemplified by the feeling among rural voters that their traditional way of life is being uprooted
by a changing nation led by large cities.
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Gimpel et al. (2020) describe the origins of this divide as well as the importance that
distance plays in establishing different cultural identities. They note that until the 20th century, the
urban population was not significant enough for there to be a political difference. As America
became increasingly urban, the differences between the two geographic types developed. Urban
living can create social isolation among individuals and can encourage deviation from traditional
social morality. Rural communities, conversely, possess the characteristics of self-reliance and
traditionalism. These identities are laid down because of distance: it isolates the cultures and
determines social interaction. Cultural differences are thus the product of two populations being
separate from one another.
The significant differences in how urban and rural America view politics allows us to
generate multiple geo-culturally based hypotheses:
H1:
H2:

We hypothesize that a community’s share of traditional populations has a positive
relationship with GOP voting gains.
We hypothesize that a community’s distance from a central city has a positive
relationship with GOP voting gains.

It’s the Economy, Stupid: Cosmopolitanism & Populism
The culture wars may lead to partisan change, but economics still plays a vital role in
American politics. The two economic paradigms split American politics: cosmopolitanism and
populism. Cosmopolitanism, which Jennings and Stoker (2017) define as encompassing a global
orientation, tends to exist in more urbanized areas, but is not necessarily solely contingent on
geography. Schueth and O’Loughlin (2008) find that cosmopolitan identification is strong among
those who are environmentalists, youthful, less patriotic, higher educated, and living in areas with
high immigrant populations –– all typically characteristics of more urban populations. The
preference for cosmopolitanism in urbanized areas arises largely out of economics. Gimpel et al.
(2020) describe cities as “centers of innovation” with the best access to “information about the
latest consumer products and technological innovations” –– traits attractive to the cosmopolitan
identity. Importantly, cosmopolitan preferences are not only held by young urban professionals,
but often also by the working class on their immediate periphery (Jennings & Stoker 2017).
Jennings and Stoker (2017) identify a fragmentation of working-class groups along new
and traditional occupations. As urban areas transition into post-industrial economies, the urban
working class largely finds employment in the service sector attending to the needs of wealthier,
urban professionals. In this way, urban workers participate more directly –– even if tangentially –
– in the cosmopolitan economy. In contrast, workers in agricultural and the diminishing industrial
sectors, participate less visibly and more indirectly to the modern globalized economy dominated
by urban professionals. This results in unequal access to the fruits of globalization, contributing to
national populist, anti-cosmopolitan backlashes (Spicer, 2018). By nature of their work, these
traditional workers often reside in less urbanized areas. Thus, geo-cultural dynamics described in
the previous section compound and amplify the cosmopolitan-versus-populist dynamics of this
section. One notable exception, which helps demonstrate the economic dimension of cosmopolitan
identity, is rural areas near recreational amenities like natural landmarks, summer lakes, and ski
areas. Residents of these places tend to work in recreational/service sector occupations rather than
the agricultural/industrial sectors typical of rural areas. As such, they vote closer to urban,
cosmopolitan voters than the rural voters that their geography may suggest (Scala & Johnson,
2017).
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Cosmopolitan voters play an important role in recent partisan shifts in American politics.
Miller and Schofield (2003) divide voters into four groups, with cosmopolitans being those who
tend to be economically conservative but socially liberal. These voters’ economic fortunes are
intimately tied to the globalized, cosmopolitan economy. They were solidly Republican under the
New Deal coalition but were critical to President Clinton’s reelection in 1996. Subsequent
moderation by the Democrats on economic issues and wariness of the GOP’s increasing
conservatism on social issues have continued this shift.
Of course, there is a natural tug-of-war in electoral politics, and as cosmopolitans were
trending Democratic, populists who had been Democrats during the New Deal era were
increasingly likely to support Republican candidates. These voters tend to think the immigration
bill signed into law by President Reagan was a mistake (Miller & Schofield, 2008) and believe
decisions made by political elites are resulting in declining communities (McQuarrie, 2017).
There is some overlap between the urban-rural divide and cosmopolitanism. As Miller and
Schofield (2003; 2008) point out, there is a cultural dimension to cosmopolitanism –– a social
liberalism produced by the diversity of urban life complimentary to cosmopolitanism. Likewise,
there is an economic component to the culture wars as voters in traditional occupations and rural
communities feel left behind by the economy of the 21st century. But as the authors point out,
culture and economics are two distinct dimensions in electoral politics; they manifest similarly in
American politics (largely because of the pervasive influence of geography) but are causally
distinct. The geo-cultural cleavage emerges chiefly out of the intrinsic differences between urban
and rural social life as a function of remoteness and population density (Gimpel, 2020).
Conversely, the cosmopolitan/populist cleavage emerges from the disparate regional impacts of
globalization. Cosmopolitans, with their access to global capital and culture (often, but not always,
by way of urban life) emerge as winners in the new economy. They benefit from generally
conservative economic policies while pursuing socially liberal projects befitting of
cosmopolitanized aesthetics of social egalitarianism. Meanwhile, workers in more traditional
occupations, economically detached from the flow of global capital and culture, turn to the politics
of reactionary populism and anti-elitism (Spicer, 2018).
With the distinctiveness of cosmopolitanism as a dimension of voting and the above
rationale in place, we deduce the following hypothesis:
H3:

We hypothesize that a community’s level of cosmopolitanism has a negative
relationship with GOP voting gains.

Data & Methods
With a variety of cultural/economic issues at play in American politics, the challenge is
identifying how this plays out across the urban-rural divide in the aggregate. The above-referenced
studies often conceptualize these issues at the individual-level of analysis. However, studying
realignment among individual voters is difficult, requiring panel studies over not just years, but
possibly even decades. Shifting the unit of analysis from the individual to the electorate can
alleviate this problem (Highton, 2020). We choose to analyze realignment at the community level
because it allows us to increase the number of observations; it also adds nuance to the analysis as
communities vary widely in their election results, even within the same county.
Data
The unit of analysis for this study is each minor civil division (MCD), or community, in
the state of Ohio. MCDs are one of the primary units of county subdivision designated by the U.S.
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Census Bureau. Each MCD is composed of exactly one sub-county legal entity; in Ohio these
entities are either townships, villages, or municipalities. As of 2020, Ohio’s 88 counties contain
1,601 MCDs, although this includes a few dozen communities that span parts of two counties,
some communities that have recently been combined, and some that have no population (such as
islands in Lake Erie). These MCDs are also referred to as community subdivisions; hereafter,
when we use the term “community”, we are using it in this context.
Every year, the U.S. Census Bureau conducts the American Community Survey (ACS),
which offers five-year estimates of more detailed demographic categories than is offered by the
decennial census. This study allows us to compare a number of demographic variables from the
ACS to election results at the presidential level from 2004 to 2020. The Ohio Secretary of State
reports election results at the precinct level, typically smaller geographic entities than MCDs. For
the purposes of comparison, precinct-level election data was aggregated to the MCD level.
Occasionally, MCDs are split by county lines. When this occurs, each split is reported as a
separate entity in the ACS data. Wherever possible, precincts were aggregated to reflect these
irregularities. Further, a single election precinct occasionally serves more than one MCD in some
years. When this occurs, the precinct election data was split and weighted according to the
population of each MCD. Lastly, yearly ACS data was sometimes missing for a small number of
MCDs due to small sample sizes. Given these irregularities in the data, it was sometimes
impossible to map MCD-level ACS data to corresponding election results. In the years that this
was the case, the MCDs with missing election data were omitted from the statistical models. All
told, our analyses include between 1,510 and 1,560 observations, depending on the election cycle
and precinct overlap.
The key questions this paper centers around address changes in voting behavior across
Ohio. To do this, we construct five dependent variables. The first four measure the GOP
presidential vote share for each election from 2008 to 2020, which allows us to see how the cultural
and socioeconomic factors have changed in importance over time. The final dependent variable
measures the percent change in GOP presidential support from 2004 to 2020 and is calculated by
subtracting the 2004 GOP vote share from the 2020 GOP vote share.
Our explanatory variables were selected to estimate the two dimensions of partisan
realignment theorized above: geo-cultural and the cosmopolitan/socioeconomic. For the cultural
dimension, we use native-born population, measured at the community level by the ACS. We test
the geographic dimension in two ways, each with its own set of models. First, we use the urbanrural continuum created by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and used by Scala &
Johnson (2017) which groups counties into categories based on population density. The continuum
ranges from the most urban metropolitan core counties to the most rural outlying counties
nonadjacent to any metropolitan or micropolitan area. In all, there are eight types; we include seven
in our models, leaving micropolitan areas as the reference category, as can be seen in Figure 1.
Our second measure of geography stems from the Gimpel et al. (2020) theory based on
distance and density. For these models, we calculated the distance between a community’s
centroid (geographic center) and the nearest city of at least 100,000 people. There are six such
cities in Ohio: Columbus, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Toledo, Dayton, and Akron. Because the
relationship between distance and presidential vote share is nonlinear, we use the natural log of
distance in our models. Density was measured as the thousands of people per square mile of land
in each community.
For the socioeconomic dimension we use four explanatory variables characteristic of
cosmopolitan demographics outlined in the previous section: median household income (in
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$10,000s), the percent of the population with a bachelor's degree or higher, the percent of the
population between 20 and 29 years old, and the percent population change between elections.
Each of these variables are measured at the community level by the ACS. Two caveats are
necessary: first, the 2020 ACS data are not yet available, so we use 2019 data; second, the inaugural
five-year ACS estimates came in 2009, which we use for the 2008 election. We are confident that
the data for these two cycles are valid because the five-year estimates are weighted toward the end
of the time series and thus do not change dramatically from one year to the next.
Finally, we include the community’s percent Black population, percent Latino population,
and region within Ohio (as demarcated by the Ohio Secretary of State) as control variables. The
Ohio Secretary of State splits the state into six regions; in our analyses, we include dummy
variables for five regions (southwest, west, northeast, southeast, and central) and leave the
northwest as the reference region.
Methods
Normally with continuous dependent variables, OLS regression would be an appropriate
statistical method of analysis. However, whenever dealing with geography, Tobler’s First Law of
Geography must be considered: “Everything is related to everything else, but near things are more
related than distant things” (ESRI N.D. a). Basically, communities and their associated data tend
to be clustered together in space (ESRI N.D. b). In this manuscript, we detailed theoretical reasons
for why communities and their presidential vote shares should be related to distance and
geography. As such, we must test for the presence of spatial autocorrelation. Tables 3-5 provide
evidence for the presence of spatial autocorrelation in the OLS models, as Moran’s I test statistic
is significant for each model. Ignoring the presence of spatial autocorrelation can introduce bias
into our coefficients and their standard errors; to account for this we run spatial error regression
models, which employ a spatial autoregressive error term to correct these biases (Anselin, 2005).
Results
As a whole, Ohio has voted increasingly Republican at the presidential level from 2004 to
2020. However, there are noticeable geographic differences in the vote shifts. Table 1 shows the
average community-level GOP presidential two-party vote shares by region and geographic
distinction. Southeastern, mostly Appalachian, Ohio shifted from an average of 56.42%
Republican in 2004 to 76.82% in 2020, a remarkable 20-point shift. Northeast and Northwest Ohio
experienced 8-point shifts in average GOP presidential vote shares; Central Ohio experienced just
under a 7-point shift. Southwestern Ohio saw the most modest GOP gains, shifting only from
65.63% Republican to 69.6%. Notably, Northeast Ohio, despite seeing an 8-point increase in
Republican vote share, remains the least strongly Republican region of the state at 58.33%
Republican in 2020 –– the only region to average less than 60% for Donald Trump’s reelection.
However, examining the trends year to year, the swing Republican from 2004 to 2020 was
not linear. Each region of the state saw decreased Republican vote shares in 2004 to 2008, as the
state swung pivotally towards Barack Obama (although only in Northeast Ohio did the average
community vote majority for Obama). In 2012, each region ticked very modestly back towards
Republicans; until in 2016, with Trump’s first election, each region swung heavily GOP. Each
region except the Southwest and Northeast saw double-digit shifts in favor of the Republicans.
The vote shares remained about stable between 2016 and 2020, inching slightly more Republican
everywhere except in the Southwest.
Approaching the vote shifts by urban-rural continuum designation, regardless of region,
offers further useful insights. From 2004 to 2020, each designation type shifted in the Republican
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candidate’s favor except the large metropolitan cores, which shifted about 8-points away from
Republicans. GOP gains were largest in the most remote parts of the state. Both nonmetropolitan
adjacent and nonadjacent saw about 17-point shifts towards the GOP. Large metropolitan suburbs
and small metropolitan suburbs saw just under 7- and 13-point shifts, respectively –– each
substantially less than their corresponding core counties.
From 2004 to 2008, all designation types saw decreases in the Republican vote share; then,
similarly to the regional breakdown, all but the large metropolitan core counties saw slight ticks
back towards Republicans in 2012. Then, with the election of Trump in 2016, all but the large
metropolitan core counties saw 10+ point shifts towards Republicans. Large metropolitan cores
saw a further point shift away from Republicans. Again, the most remote counties saw the largest
shifts towards Trump.
Figure 2 shows the change in two party presidential vote share between 2004 and 2020 at
the MCD level. The five major cities labeled on the map reflect a continuation of strong
Democratic support in the most urban areas. The cities themselves show small Democratic gains
in Cincinnati and Columbus and small Republican gains in Cleveland, Dayton, Toledo, and Akron.
But, given the starting point of strong Democratic support, a shift in either direction is marginal to
the broader trend evident in Table 1: urban areas (and their immediate suburbs) are voting less and
less Republican. Most MCDs adjacent metropolitan city cores show moderate to strong shifts
towards Democrats. (MCDs directly adjacent city cores are generally treated as part of the city
core for purposes of the urban-rural continuum.) As MCDs move further from city cores, (into
small and large suburbs on the urban-rural continuum) shifts become more moderate and mixed.
Generally, these MCDs experienced moderate Republican shifts, but a number experienced
moderate Democratic shifts as well. These are some of the few remaining battlegrounds in the
state. The places that saw the greatest shifts towards Republicans were the most remote parts of
the state and (relatedly) the Appalachian regions of the state. The southeast and far east of the state
experienced substantial shifts towards the GOP, providing strong evidence of realignment in these
areas.
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the seven continuous variables. The number of each
variable fluctuates slightly due to inconsistencies in the ACS data (median income data was not
reported for some about 20 MCDs, for instance). The median Ohio community is 99.1% native
(standard deviation of 2.87) and 96.7% white (standard deviation of 10.9) indicating a low rate of
racial and ethnic diversity. Further, the median Ohio community saw a -0.85% decline in
population. However, the standard deviation of population change was quite high at 17.94,
indicating disparate impacts of the general trend of population decline. For instance, Lenox
Township in Ashtabula County saw the highest percent population growth in the dataset at a 98%
increase.
Figure 3 shows the two-party presidential vote share for just the 2020 election. It offers
more support for the general trends in Figure 2 and one key additional insight. Figure 3 shows
strong Democratic support in city cores and immediate suburbs with decreasing Democratic
support moving outwards. What this map emphasizes, which is less evident in Figure 2, are two
other micropolitan areas: Youngstown in the northeast and Athens in the southeast. The core
MCDs of these micropolitan areas show moderately strong Democratic support but are
unremarkable when looking only at Figure 2. This suggests a more stable, unchanging support for
both Democratic and Republican candidates in micropolitan areas.
Moving to our multivariate models, Table 3 displays the results of the 2008-2020
presidential election results using the urban-rural continuum as the geographic explanatory
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variables. The R-squared for each model is at least 0.72, and as indicated in the previous section,
the Moran’s I test of spatial autocorrelation is statistically significant. For each model, the Akaike
info criterion (AiCc) is lower for the spatial error regression than for the OLS model, indicating
that the former does a better job of explaining the dependent variable (Anselin 2005). Finally, the
lambda spatial error term is statistically significant, which suggests that the model was improved
overall by using the spatial error regression.
Taking each year in sequence, the 2008 election exhibited evidence of both geo-cultural
and cosmopolitan differences across Ohio communities. First, the urban-rural divide was present
as communities in large metro core counties, small metro core counties, and small metro suburbs
were more favorable to Senator Obama than to Senator McCain, while the opposite was true among
those in other metro and non-metro counties. In addition, the native-born percentage was both
positive and significant, as hypothesized: each percentage of native-born population was expected
to add 0.17 percent to McCain’s vote share. For the median community (99.1 percent native-born),
this equated to nearly 17 percent.
Three of the four cosmopolitan variables were statistically significant: the percentage with
a college degree and share of young people were negative and statistically significant; median
household income was positive and statistically significant. The first two variables, with low
coefficients and medians, did not provide much substantive significance (each contributed an
expected one percent to Obama). Median household income, on the other hand, was more
substantively significant: communities at the median level of income (roughly $60,000) were
expected to add just over 10 percent to McCain’s vote share.
Four years later, when President Obama faced reelection, the story was much the same.
Communities in large metro core, small metro core, and small metro suburban counties were
expected to vote more Democratic, while those in other metro counties were expected to vote more
Republican. In terms of the geographic variables, once again, other metro and non-metro countries
were favorable to the Republican nominee, adding about five percent and two percent to his vote
share, respectively. One deviation from the 2008 model was that communities in nonmetro
adjacent counties were expected to add about two percent to Romney’s vote share. The biggest
difference was that the percent native-born was not statistically significant.
In terms of cosmopolitanism, three of the four variables were statistically significant,
although this time it was median household income (positive), the percentage of young people
(negative), and population change (positive). The last two were not substantively significant, but
communities with a high median household income were generally staunchly Republican: the
median community in terms of income gave Romney an additional 10.8 percent; those that were
one standard deviation above average were expected to give him an additional 50 percent.
The 2016 presidential election saw slight changes to the model’s results. Consistent with
2008 and 2012, large and small metro core communities were expected to be more favorable to
Secretary Clinton, as were small metro suburbs. Trump did especially well in nonmetro adjacent
communities as well as other metropolitan communities, once again showcasing the urban-rural
divide. Culturally, the percent native-born was statistically significant as it was in 2008, but the
coefficient was much higher (0.49 compared to 0.17). This means that Trump was expected to
win nearly 49 percent of the vote in the typical community (which was 99.1 percent native-born)
before adjusting for the other factors.
The cosmopolitan dimension was also present in 2016, perhaps in a more pronounced way
than in 2008. Whereas in that year the percentage of a community with a college degree was
statistically significant and negative but not substantively significant, 2016 saw a shift in the form
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of a stronger coefficient. For each percent of the community with a degree, Clinton was expected
to gain 0.38 percent. For the typical community (11.5 percent with a degree) this added up to a
four percent increase; for the well-above average community (two standard deviations above the
mean), this advantage grew to nearly 10 percent. Wealthier communities were more Trumpfriendly, as an increase in median household income of $10,000 resulted in a two percent GOP
gain. In the typical community, this meant a roughly 12 percent advantage for Trump, controlling
for other factors.
The urban-rural divide continued to grow in 2020. Suburban Ohio was the only
battleground, as the large and small metropolitan communities were Biden-friendly and the more
rural areas were Trump strongholds. Notably, the coefficients for non-metro adjacent and nonmetro other communities were the highest of the time series (2.21 and 2.29, respectively).
Furthermore, the coefficient for a community’s native-born population grew to 0.77. Again, with
the typical community having a large native-born population, this portends to a large built-in GOP
advantage.
The cosmopolitan dimension was also different in 2020 than in prior elections. The college
degree percent coefficient was at its absolute largest (-0.46), as were the coefficients for young
people (-0.16) and percent population change (0.33). Taken singly, a community with median
education would have favored Biden by nearly five percent; a community with the typical share
of young people would have favored Biden by just under two percent; and a community with
average population growth would have favored Trump by less than one-half percent. Notably, the
coefficient for median household income was its lowest (1.03), indicating that Trump’s advantage
in wealthier communities shrunk from 12 percent in 2016 to about 6.5 percent in 2020.
Table 4 shows how our second measurement of geography, distance and density, relates to
presidential election results. As with the models in Table 3, those in Table 4 have a strong Rsquared (at least 0.74) and are an improvement from the OLS models based on the AiCc and
lambda coefficient. Importantly, the other explanatory and control variables are nearly identical
in statistical and substantive significance; as a result, we will focus on the distance and density
variables.
As hypothesized, the density variable is negative and statistically significant in each of the
models, while the distance variable is positive and statistically significant in each. In 2008 and
2012, for each 1,000 people per square mile, Obama was expected to receive an additional two
percent of the vote. Since most communities are small and relatively sparsely populated, this
advantage is most prevalent in larger core cities and suburbs. Particularly densely populated
communities (the top one percent) were expected to provide Obama with around a 4-6 percent
advantage. This advantage did not hold for Clinton in 2016, as the density coefficient was -0.21.
In 2020, however, the coefficient of -3.36 surpassed those for 2008 and 2012, suggesting that
Biden gained a 7-8 percent advantage in Ohio’s most densely populated communities. Using the
natural log of distance makes the coefficient difficult to interpret, but the relationship is most
significant in 2020, followed by 2016.
Finally, we examine the change in presidential vote share in Ohio communities from 20042020. The first column of Table 5 provides the results using the urban-rural continuum measure;
the second uses the density and distance measure. As with the previous models, the spatial error
regressions improve upon the OLS models as indicated by the lower AiCc’s and significant and
positive lambda coefficients. For both models, the R-squared is at least 0.74.
In the first model, we see strong evidence of the cosmopolitan dimension along with mixed
evidence for the geo-cultural dimension. Starting with the latter, communities in large
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metropolitan core counties were expected to shift about 2.4 percent more Democratic over the time
frame, while communities in small metropolitan suburban counties were expected to move roughly
1.4 percent in the opposite direction. None of the other urban-rural continuum variables were
statistically significant, indicating that there was not a significant amount of vote share shifting in
these communities. However, the percent native-born variable was positive and significant. With
a coefficient of 0.61, this suggests that many communities shifted strongly toward the GOP from
2004-2020, controlling for other factors.
Stronger evidence was exhibited for the cosmopolitan dimension in the first model. For
each percent increase in college education, a community was expected to shift slightly more than
one-half of a percent to the Democrats. In the typical community, this equates to an expected 5-6
percent Democratic advantage. For each $10,000 increase in a community’s median household
income, Democrats were expected to gain nearly one-third of a percent, equating to another 1-2
percent advantage. Combined with another 0.6 percent Democratic gain in the typical community
in terms of percentage of young people, and cosmopolitan trends favored Democrats by over 7-8
percent. Still, while Democrats made gains in this dimension, the GOP gains in the cultural
dimension were far greater.
The results were somewhat similar using the density and distance geographic measure.
Every 1,000 people per square mile was expected to add about two percent to the Democratic vote
share. However, the distance variable was not statistically significant. Democrats also made gains
among those communities with higher education and income, but once again, these gains were
more than offset by the cultural dimension: the coefficient of 0.54 for the native-born variable
indicates strong movement in most communities to the GOP.
Conclusion and Discussion
Over the course of the 21st century, Ohio has transitioned from a battleground state in
presidential elections to one with a distinct Republican lean. This realignment, whether secular or
critical, has significant implications for the state’s elections and national presidential campaigns.
This manuscript attempts to understand the partisan shift in Ohio from 2004-2020. To do so, we
examined voting trends within each region and by the OMB’s urban-rural breakdown. We then
ran multivariate spatial regressions using ACS data to determine the significant factors in GOP
presidential vote shares across Ohio’s communities for each cycle from 2008-2020 and for the
shift in GOP presidential vote share from 2004-2020.
Our analysis provides a complex explanation for this realignment. The political science
literature often focuses on two slightly overlapping theoretical viewpoints for political shifts: the
geo-cultural lens focuses on urban-rural distinctiveness and culture. We find some evidence for
the urban-rural divide being a driving force for Ohio’s realignment. Yes, there is a huge difference
between large metropolitan core communities and other communities: those in the large
metropolitan core counties is where Trump performed his worst in both 2016 and 2020. Yet, those
were also George W. Bush’s weakest spots as well. It was not until 2020 that we saw the most
rural communities vote significantly more Republican than others when controlling for other
factors, despite the 20+ percent difference between them and large metropolitan core communities.
When we examined density and distance instead of the urban-rural continuum, these results
became clearer: density and distance are statistically significant, but substantively, they are not the
most important factors in presidential election results.
If the biggest contributor is not geography, what is? Culture. The percent native-born
population is the most substantial explanation for how a community votes in presidential elections
and what is driving Ohio's realignment over the past 20 years. This is evidenced by the large
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coefficients in the 2016 and 2020 models in Tables 3 and 4 as well as in the 2004-2020 change
models in Table 5. The GOP advantage across the state is significant, considering that most Ohio
communities are over 99 percent native-born. These GOP gains more than offset the Democrats
advantage in large metropolitan core communities.
Despite the significance of the native-born percentage variable, it is important to note that
Democrats have made inroads in more cosmopolitan communities. This is evidenced by their
advantage in more highly educated communities and those with a higher share of young people.
Democrats have also improved their performance in wealthy communities. While median
household income is a significant and positive predictor of GOP vote share, we note that this
advantage was more diminished in 2020 than in previous cycles. Furthermore, communities with
higher incomes have seen a large shift in Democratic vote share between 2004-2020. Again, these
pro-Democratic shifts were not enough to offset GOP gains in other communities.
All told, this evidence shows the complexities of political realignment. Newton’s Third
Law states that for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. In political realignment,
the opposite reaction may not be equal to the original action, but it is present nonetheless. The
New Deal coalitions are shifting; some traditional Democratic strongholds in Northeast Ohio are
quickly becoming solidly Republican; Figure 3 shows how manufacturing hubs such as
Youngstown, Warren, Ashtabula, and Lorain are shifting; their surrounding communities are now
Republican. At the same time, formerly reliable GOP areas in suburban Columbus, Cincinnati,
and Cleveland are trending Democratic. As the multivariate models indicate, these are the
battlegrounds in Ohio politics: neither party has an inherent advantage at this point and candidates
looking for persuadable voters can find them in more cosmopolitan communities such as those
along the wealthy State Route 91 corridor in Cuyahoga and Summit counties.
What does this mean for elections in Ohio? There are a few implications of this study.
First, Ohio is a state that the GOP has a built-in advantage in the current political climate. The
party’s gains statewide did not just occur in the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections; Republican
statewide candidates swept the partisan races in the 2018 midterm elections. This is noteworthy
in that 2018 was such a strong year for Democrats in many places across the country. Does this
mean that Democrats have no chance of winning a statewide presidential or state constitutional
race? Not exactly. Despite the GOP’s advantage due to the urban-rural divide and native-born
population, Ohio only leans Republican. Just as Democrats have won in traditionally Republican
states with a populist history (i.e., Kansas) and Republicans have won in traditionally Democratic
strongholds with a cosmopolitan track record (Massachusetts), there are scenarios where
Democrats could win statewide. It would require a race in which the Democratic candidate is
strong in comparison to their Republican opponent and take place in a strong pro-Democratic
cycle, but it is possible. Indeed, Democrats have won three of the past four state Supreme Court
races across 2018 and 2020.
Second, our analysis only includes presidential elections. Realignment typically starts
statewide before trickling down to legislative and local races (Bullock, 1988). In 2020, some
suburban GOP state legislators, such as state senators Stephanie Kunze (Columbus suburbs) and
Matt Dolan (Cleveland suburbs) held on to seats that were newly competitive. Since they are termlimited in 2024, it is very possible that Democrats could pick these seats. At the same, Republicans
started picking up state legislative seats in areas previously strong for Democrats, such as
Ashtabula, Trumbull, and Mahoning counties in the northeast. The result of any state legislative
realignment may be that the GOP continues to have large majorities in Columbus, but such a
majority could be increasingly rural and exurban.
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Finally, we caution readers about extrapolating too much from prior elections. We do not
know how much more - and at which rate - change will occur. Put differently, at some point the
GOP will reach its ceiling in rural areas and its floor in urban/suburban communities. Given that
Trump received roughly 70-80 percent in many communities outside of the large metropolitan
core, it may be difficult for those margins to grow. Also, there is still a question as to how much
Republican gains depend on Trumpism (however loosely defined). While it is unrealistic to expect
our party coalitions to revert to their 1990s-2000s form, future electoral coalitions will differ from
those in 2016 and 2020. As Miller and Schofield (2006, 2008) point out, each election cycle is
unique in terms of the economic-cultural balance. No two elections are, or can be, identical.
Future presidential contests will not completely be determined by those in the recent past; by the
time 2024 and 2028 arrive, new issues and/or coalitions will emerge.
Our analysis also raises additional questions for research. First and foremost is the question
of whether this realignment is secular or critical. While we do not formally test for this, there is
an argument to be made for each. Trump performed well in communities where other GOP
presidential nominees had done well, particularly George W. Bush in 2004. Romney’s
performance in some rural areas (nonmetro adjacent and other metro) was on par with Trump’s
performances in 2016 and 2020, controlling for other factors. The pro-GOP trend in the southeast
corner of the state started prior to Trump’s ascension to the presidency. This suggests secular
realignment was taking place throughout the early part of the 21st century.
Yet there is evidence that 2016 marked a stark departure from previous elections. The
GOP gains in Southeast Ohio accelerated in 2016; the same was true in other regions as well, even
as Trump lost the national popular vote both times. In our multivariate models, the coefficients
for education and native-born population jumped considerably in absolute terms in 2016. And
while not a focal point of our analysis, the coefficient for Latino population decreased in absolute
terms from 2008-2012 to 2016-2020. These observations point to the possibility of a critical
realignment.
Future research should determine the strength of evidence for a critical versus secular
realignment in Ohio. Using Nardulli’s (1995) method to determine if a critical election occurred
would be of particular value in a future analysis. Additional research should also probe the cultural
dimension a bit further. While we have access to a significant amount of data thanks to the ACS,
there are some limits; namely, the ACS does not ask any religion-based questions. Religiosity is
a variable that was important in similar research. Even if we are unable to systematically explore
it at the community-level, a case study or two would be valuable.

Published by Carroll Collected, 2021

13

The Journal of Economics and Politics, Vol. 26 [2021], Iss. 1, Art. 4

References
Abramowitz, A. I., & Saunders, K. L. (1998). Ideological realignment in the US electorate.
Journal of Politics, 60 (3), 634–652.
Adams, G. D. (1997). Abortion: Evidence of an issue evolution. American Journal of Political
Science, 718–737.
Anselin, L. (2005). Exploring spatial Data with GeoDa: A workbook. University of Illinois,
Urbana-Champaign.
Bawn, K., Cohen, M. Karol, D., Masket, S., Noel, H., & Zaller, J. (2012). A Theory of Political
Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics. Perspectives on
Politics, 10 (3), 571–97. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592712001624
Bullock, C. S. (1988). Regional realignment from an officeholding perspective. Journal of
Politics, 50 (3), 553–74. https://doi.org/10.2307/2131458
Bullock, C. S., Hoffman, D. R., & Gaddie, R. K. (2005). The consolidation of the white southern
congressional vote. Political Research Quarterly, 58 (2), 231–43.
https://doi.org/10.2307/3595625
———. (2006). Regional variations in the realignment of American politics, 1944–2004*. Social
Science Quarterly, 87 (3), 494–518. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6237.2006.00393.x
Philip, B. (2021). Analysis | How the culture-war divide in the U.S. compares to other
democracies. Washington Post, May 7, 2021.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/05/07/how-culture-war-divide-uscompares-other-democracies/
Burnham, W. D. (1971). Critical elections: And the mainsprings of American politics. W. W.
Norton & Company.
Campbell, D., Layman, G. C, Green, J. C, & Sumaktoyo, N. G. (2018). Putting politics first: The
impact of politics on American religious and secular orientations. American Journal of
Political Science, 62 (3), 551–65. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12365
Campbell, J. E. (1985). Sources of the New Deal realignment: The contributions of conversion
and mobilization to partisan change. Western Political Quarterly, 38(3), 357–76.
https://doi.org/10.1177/106591298503800304
Carey, N. (2016). In rural-urban divide, U.S. voters are worlds apart. Reuters, November 11,
2016, sec. Full coverage of the 2016 U.S. Election. https://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-election-rural-idUSKBN13625Q
Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections. Retrieved July 27, 2021, from
https://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/.
Erikson, R. S., & Tedin, K. L. (1981). The 1928–1936 partisan realignment: The case for the
conversion hypothesis. American Political Science Review, 75(4), 951–962.
ESRI. Spatial Autocorrelation. From
http://support.esri.com/en/knowledgebase/GISDictionary/term/spatial%20autocorrelation
———. Tobler’s First Law of Geography. From
http://support.esri.com/en/knowledgebase/GISDictionary/term/Tobler%27s%20First%20
Law%20of%20Geography
Evich, H. B. (2016). Revenge of the rural voter. POLITICO, Retrieved November 13, 2016.
From https://politi.co/2BAKpR6
Gimpel, J. (2021). The 2020 election campaign was over quickly. Political Geography, June,
102430. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2021.102430

https://collected.jcu.edu/jep/vol26/iss1/4

14

Swearingen and Lindstrom: A Battleground No More

Gimpel, J. G., Lovin, N. Moy, B., & Reeves, A. (2020). The urban–rural gulf in American
political behavior. Political Behavior, 42(4), 1343–1368.
Hackworth, J. The myth of the moderate suburb: Exploring the spatiality of racial realignment in
presidential voting patterns in Ohio, 1932-2016.
Highton, B. (2020). The cultural realignment of state white electorates in the 21st Century.
Political Behavior 42(4), 1319–1341.
Introducing the 2021 Cook Political Report Partisan Voter Index. The Cook Political Report.
Retrieved July 27, 2021, from https://cookpolitical.com/analysis/national/pvi/introducing2021-cook-political-report-partisan-voter-index
Jennings, W. & Stoker, G. (2017). Tilting towards the cosmopolitan axis? Political change in
England and the 2017 general election. The Political Quarterly, 88(3), 359–69.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12403
Johnston, R., Manley, D., Jones, K., & Rohla, R. (2020). The geographical polarization of the
American electorate: A country of increasing electoral landslides? GeoJournal, 85(1),
187–204.
Johnston, R, Rohla, R., Manley, D., & Jones, K. (2019). Voting for Trump and the electoral
mosaics of US metropolitan areas: Exploring changing patterns of party support by
neighborhood. Cities 86 (March), 94–101. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2018.12.011
Kelly, P. & Linda Lobao. (2019). The social bases of rural-urban political divides: Social status,
work, and sociocultural beliefs. Rural Sociology, 84(4), 669–705.
https://doi.org/10.1111/ruso.12256
Key, V.O. (1955). A theory of critical elections. Journal of Politics, 17(1), 3–18.
———. (1959). Secular realignment and the party system. Journal of Politics, 21(2), 198–210.
Kovac, M. (2020). Democrats’ blue wave sweeps through Franklin County offices. Columbus
Dispatch. November, 11, 2020. From
https://www.dispatch.com/story/news/politics/county/2020/11/04/democrats-dominatefranklin-county-races/3745551001/.
Ladd, E. C. & Hadley, C. D. (1975). Transformations of the American party system: Political
coalitions from the New Deal to the 1970s. WW Norton.
Lindaman, K. & Haider-Markel, D. P. (2002). Issue evolution, political parties, and the culture
wars. Political Research Quarterly, 55(1), 91–110.
https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290205500104
Mayhew, D. R. (2000). Electoral realignments. Annual Review of Political Science, 3(1), 449–
74. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.3.1.449
———. (2008). Electoral Realignments. Yale University Press.
McKee, S. C. & Teigen, J. M.. (2016). The new blue: Northern in-migration in southern
presidential elections. PS: Political Science & Politics, 49(02), 228–33.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096516000081
McQuarrie, M. (2017). The revolt of the rust belt: Place and politics in the age of anger. British
Journal of Sociology, 68(S1), S120–52. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-4446.12328
Miller, G. & Schofield, N. (2003). Activists and partisan realignment in the United States.
American Political Science Review,97(02). https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055403000650
———. (2008). The transformation of the Republican and Democratic Party coalitions in the
U.S.” Perspectives on Politics 6 (3): 433–50.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592708081218.

Published by Carroll Collected, 2021

15

The Journal of Economics and Politics, Vol. 26 [2021], Iss. 1, Art. 4

Monnat, S. M. & Brown. , D. L. (2017). More than a rural revolt: Landscapes of despair and the
2016 presidential election.” Journal of Rural Studies, 55(October), 227–36.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2017.08.010
Nardulli, P. F. (1995). The concept of a critical realignment, electoral behavior, and political
phange. American Political Science Review, 89 (1), 10–22.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2083071
Petrocik, J. R. (1987). Realignment: New party coalitions and the nationalization of the South.
Journal of Politics, 49(2), 347–375.
Pierson, P. (2017). American hybrid: Donald Trump and the strange merger of populism and
plutocracy. British Journal of Sociology, 68, S105–S119.
Prothero, S. (2016). Op-ed: Why liberals win culture wars and conservatives win elections. Los
Angeles Times. February 14, 2016. From https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe0214-prothero-culture-war-20160214-story.html
Scala, D. J. & Johnson, K. M. (2017). Political polarization along the rural-urban continuum?
The geography of the presidential vote, 2000–2016. ANNALS of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science, 672(1), 162–184.
Schattschneider, E. E. (1960). The semisovereign people. Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Schueth, S. & O’Loughlin, J. (2008). Belonging to the world: Cosmopolitanism in geographic
contexts. Geoforum, Conversations Across the Divide, 39(2), 926–41.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2007.10.002
Shearer, C. (2016). The small town-big city split that elected Donald Trump. Brookings (blog).
November 11, 2016. From https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2016/11/11/thesmall-town-big-city-split-that-elected-donald-trump/.
Shively, W. P. (1992). From differential abstention to conversion: A change in electoral change,
1864-1988. American Journal of Political Science, 36(2), 309-330.
Spicer, J. S. (2018). Electoral systems, regional resentment and the surprising success of AngloAmerican populism | Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society | Oxford
Academic. 2018. From https://academic.oup.com/cjres/article-abstract/11/1/115/4837314
Stanton, Z. (2021). How the ‘culture war’ could break democracy. POLITICO. May 20, 2021.
Retrieved from https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/05/20/culture-warpolitics-2021-democracy-analysis-489900.
State PVIs. The Cook Political Report. Retrieved July 27, 2021, from
https://cookpolitical.com/state-pvis.
Stimson, J. A. & Carmines, E. G. (1989). Issue evolution: Race and the transformation of
American politics. Princeton University Press.
Sundquist, J. L. (1983). Dynamics of the party system: Alignment and realignment of political
parties in the United States. Second edition. D.C: Brookings Institution Press.
Teixeira, R. (2009). The coming end of the culture wars. Center for American Progress. July 15,
2009. From
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/reports/2009/07/15/6454/thecoming-end-of-the-culture-wars/
Tipping-point state. (2021). From. https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Tippingpoint_state&oldid=1033557154
Valentino, N. A. & Sears, D. O. (2005). Old times there are not forgotten: Race and partisan
realignment in the contemporary South. American Journal of Political Science, 49(3),
672–88. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00136.x.

https://collected.jcu.edu/jep/vol26/iss1/4

16

Swearingen and Lindstrom: A Battleground No More

Table 1: GOP Presidential Vote Share by Region and Urban-Rural Continuum, 2004-2020
2004
2008
2012
2016
2020 Δ 04-20
N
Central
Northeast
Northwest
Southeast
Southwest
Lrg Metro Core
Lrg Metro Sub
Sml Metro Core
Sml Metro Sub
NonMetroAdj Micropol
NonMetroAdj Other
NonMetroNonAdj Micropol
NonMetroNonAdj Other

Published by Carroll Collected, 2021

65.44
50.02
64.8
56.42
65.63
49.06
62.26
52.69
55.94
62.42
61.96
68.79
63.65

62.11
47.85
58.4
55.56
62.95
45.03
59.2
51.31
53.67
59.36
58.86
67.69
60.73

62.55
48.88
61.22
57.45
64.59
44.84
59.93
52.42
56.34
61.04
61.97
70.15
63.68

72.33
57.91
72.47
74.57
70.51
43.43
69.49
63.26
68.72
74.57
76.94
81.64
78.3

72.36
58.33
73.17
76.82
69.6
41.19
69.24
63.75
69.66
75.86
78.88
82.22
81.03

6.92
8.31
8.37
20.4
3.97
-7.87
6.98
11.06
13.72
13.44
16.92
13.43
17.38

287
327
273
444
258
127
311
195
139
547
186
28
56
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Table 2: Continuous Variable Descriptive Statistics, 2020
Mean
Median
s.d.
White (%)
Median Income ($10,000)
College Grad (%)
Young (%)
Native (%)
Density (1,000 people/mi2)
Distance
Pop Change (%)

https://collected.jcu.edu/jep/vol26/iss1/4

93.49
6.33
13.34
10.86
98.12
0.2
41.14
0.59

96.7
6.01
11.5
10.6
99.1
0.037
39.7
-0.85

10.9
21.96
8.24
4.56
2.87
0.39
23.5
17.94

Min

Max

N

5.2
0.59
0
0
79.5
0.00
0.3
-89.35

100
25.00
49.1
39
100
3.5
116
98

1577
1565
1577
1581
1577
1601
1601
1532
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Table 3: Factors Affecting Ohio Presidential Results, 2008-2020 (Urban-Rural Continuum)
Variable
Urban-Rural Continuum
Large Metro Core
Large Metro Suburbs
Small Metro Core
Small Metro Suburbs
Nonmetro Adjacent
Other Metro
Nonmetro Other
Other Culture
Native-born pct
Cosmopolitanism
College Degree pct
Median HH Income
Young Population pct
Population Change pct
Control Variables
Black percent
Latino percent
Southwest
West
Northeast
Southeast
Central
Constant
Lambda (spatial error)
Log Likelihood
R-Squared
n
Moran’s I
AiCc (OLS regression)
AiCc (Spatial regression)

2008

2012

2016

2020

-5.39*** (1.38)
-0.45 (0.86)
-3.37*** (0.84)
-2.43** (0.91)
0.66 (0.74)
4.12* (1.64)
1.92* (1.14)

-4.97*** (1.47)
-0.51 (0.92)
-3.57*** (0.89)
-2.18* (0.97)
1.98* (0.79)
4.87** (1.75)
2.01* (1.21)

-6.84*** (1.24)
-0.92 (0.78)
-3.29*** (0.77)
-1.45* (0.84)
1.98** (0.69)
4.53** (1.54)
1.52 (1.06)

-7.93*** (1.25)
-0.28 (0.79)
-3.59 (0.78)***
-1.33 (0.85)
2.21 (0.69)**
3.09 (1.55)*
2.29 (1.06)*

0.17* (0.093)

0.14 (0.11)

0.49*** (0.08)

0.79 (0.08)***

-0.08* (0.03)
1.59*** (0.14)
-0.12** (0.04)
0.00 (0.00)

-0.03 (0.04)
1.80*** (0.15)
-0.14*** (0.04)
-0.003* (0.001)

-0.38*** (0.02)
2.00*** (.014)
-0.14*** (0.04)
0.01 (0.01)

-0.46 (0.03)***
1.03 (0.13)***
-0.16 (0.04)***
0.33 (0.06)***

-0.55*** (0.02)
-0.21** (0.07)
3.50 (2.27)
1.95 (1.69)
-3.20 (1.71)
-0.51 (1.89)
-1.54 (1.56)
37.24*** (9.58)
0.86*** (0.03)
-5,095
0.72
1,546
30.51***
10,713.9
10,229.1

-0.55*** (0.02)
-0.30* (0.15)
3.01 (2.47)
1.55 (1.82)
-2.66 (1.86)
-0.48 (2.05)
-2.85 (1.69)
40.51*** (10.72)
0.88*** (0.02)
-5,196
0.73
1,548
32.55***
10,979.6
10,431.2

-0.58*** (0.02)
-0.18*** (0.05)
3.65 (1.92)
3.14* (1.47)
-2.01 (1.44)
-0.09 (1.62)
-0.14 (1.36)
22.43** (8.56)
0.79*** (0.03)
-5,006
0.82
1,548
22.36***
10,349.5
10,052.4

-0.59 (0.02)***
-0.17 (0.05)***
2.72 (1.98)
3.05 (1.51)*
-2.07 (1.49)
-0.53 (1.66)
0.41 (1.39)
-3.11 (7.86)
0.80*** (0.03)
-5,062
0.83
1,560
22.72***
10,477.1
10,163.8

Dependent variable is the GOP nominee’s share of the two-party vote. One-tailed test where hypothesized.
Standard errors provided in the parentheses. Median household income measured in $10,000. Bolded coefficients
indicate statistical significance, p < 0.05.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table 4: Factors Affecting Ohio Presidential Results, 2008-2020 (Density & Distance)
Variable
Density & Distance
Density (1,000/mi2)
Distance (natural log)
Other Culture
Native-born pct
Cosmopolitanism
College Degree pct
Median HH Income
Young Population pct
Population Change pct
Control Variables
Black pct
Latino pct
Southwest
West
Northeast
Southeast
Central
Constant
Lambda (spatial error)
Log Likelihood
R-Squared
n
Moran’s I
AiCc (OLS regression)
AiCc (Spatial regression)

2008

2012

2016

2020

-2.15*** (0.26)
2.08*** (0.64)

-2.21*** (0.28)
2.68*** (0.69)

-0.21*** (0.06)
4.44*** (0.52)

-3.36*** (0.25)
2.69*** (0.54)

0.21* (0.09)

0.09 (0.10)

0.55*** (0.08)

0.72*** (0.08)

-0.03 (0.04)
1.19*** (0.15)
-0.05 (0.04)
0.001 (0.001)

0.03 (0.04)
1.36*** (0.15)
-0.08* (0.04)
-0.003** (0.001)

-0.37*** (0.02)
1.96*** (0.14)
-0.10** (0.04)
0.00 (0.01)

-0.40*** (0.03)
0.58*** (0.11)
-0.06* (0.03)
0.29*** (0.06)

-0.50*** (0.02)
-0.14* (0.07)
2.55 (2.20)
0.23 (1.64)
-3.96* (1.74)
-1.99 (1.89)
-1.91 (1.54)
27.78** (9.65)
0.88*** (0.02)
-4,947
0.74
1,511
33.01***
10,485.5
9,923.4

-0.50*** (0.02)
-0.37* (0.15)
2.81 (2.37)
0.35 (1.76)
-3.58 (1.87)
-1.91 (2.03)
-2.77 (1.65)
37.57*** (10.72)
0.89*** (0.02)
-5,043
0.75
1,510
34.07***
10,708.4
10,115.6

-0.57*** (0.02)
-0.10 (0.05)
3.70* (1.74)
2.63 (1.38)
-3.50* (1.37)
-2.29 (1.54)
-0.42 (1.28)
0.98 (8.62)
0.76*** (0.04)
-4,866
0.82
1,510
21.13***
10,032.2
9,761.6

-0.53*** (0.02)
-0.08 (0.05)
3.00 (1.72)
2.16 (1.35)
-2.90* (1.34)
-2.49 (1.51)
0.26 (1.25)
-3.54 (7.87)
0.77*** (0.03)
-4,843
0.85
1,519
22.46***
10,012.4
9,716.2

Dependent variable is the GOP nominee’s share of the two-party vote. One-tailed test where hypothesized.
Standard errors provided in the parentheses. Median household income measured in $10,000; density measured in
people per square mile (1,000). Bolded coefficients indicate statistical significance, p < 0.05.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table 5: Factors Affecting The Change in Ohio Presidential Results, 2004-2020
Variable
Urban-Rural Continuum
Large Metro Core
Large Metro Suburbs
Small Metro Core
Small Metro Suburbs
Nonmetro Adjacent
Other Metro
Nonmetro Other
Density & Distance
Density (1,000/mi2)
Distance (natural log)
Other Culture
Native-born pct
Cosmopolitanism
College Degree pct
Median HH Income
Young Population pct
Population Change pct
Control Variables
Black percent
Latino percent
Southwest
West
Northeast
Southeast
Central
Constant
Lambda (spatial error)
Log Likelihood
R-Squared
n
Moran’s I
AiCc (OLS regression)
AiCc (Spatial regression)

Urban-Rural Continuum

Density & Distance

-2.46* (1.18)
0.14 (0.73)
1.09 (0.72)
1.45* (0.79)
0.82 (0.66)
-1.61 (1.44)
0.49 (1.02)

--------

---

-2.02*** (0.24)
0.22 (0.51)

0.61*** (0.07)

0.54*** (0.07)

-0.53*** (0.03)
-0.32** (0.10)
-0.08* (0.03)
0.00 (0.01)

-0.48*** (0.03)
-0.62*** (0.11)
-0.03 (0.03)
0.00 (0.01)

-0.16*** (0.02)
-0.04 (0.05)
-1.26 (1.72)
0.99 (1.34)
3.76** (1.31)
5.01*** (1.48)
4.07** (1.25)
-41.55*** (7.71)
0.75*** (0.04)
-4,799
0.74
1,510
17.94***
9,856.8
9,639.5

-0.13*** (0.02)
-0.00 (0.05)
-1.33 (1.60)
1.23 (1.28)
4.28*** (1.25)
4.77*** (1.41)
3.79** (1.18)
-33.33*** (7.63)
0.74*** (0.04)
-4,799
0.75
1,519
20.34***
9,877.23
9,628.39

Dependent variable is the change in the GOP nominee’s share of the two-party vote from 2004-2020. One-tailed
test where hypothesized. Standard errors provided in the parentheses. Median household income measured in
$10,000; density measured in people per square mile (1,000). Bolded coefficients indicate statistical significance, p
< 0.05.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Figure 1: Urban-Rural Continuum Map

Map created by authors.

https://collected.jcu.edu/jep/vol26/iss1/4

22

Swearingen and Lindstrom: A Battleground No More

Figure 2: 2020 Ohio Presidential Election Results

Map created by authors
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Figure 3: Shift in Presidential Voting in Ohio, 2004-2020

Map created by authors.
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